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I. Introduction 
On July 23, 2010, pro se plaintiff Shepard Johnson filed a 
diversity action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District 
of California.1 Johnson alleged that more than a dozen 
defendants initiated criminal proceedings against Johnson in 
Panama and conspired to avoid fulfilling conditions, covenants, 
and restrictions for a planned development.2 Johnson alleged 
malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy to commit malicious 
                                                                                                     
 1. Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. May 10, 2012). In Johnson, the court asked whether it had personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant, id. at *2–7, and whether a claim against a 
defendant over whom the court lacked personal jurisdiction could be severed 
from the action and transferred to another venue. Id. at *8–10. The Johnson 
court, finding that personal jurisdiction did not exist over defendant Kim 
Parsons, severed the plaintiff’s claims against Parsons under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 21 and transferred the claims to the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Colorado. Id. at *9. The court determined that personal jurisdiction 
did not exist over Parsons in California and personal jurisdiction for the other 
defendants did not exist in Colorado (where Parsons resided). Id. at *8. The 
Johnson court then conducted a review of the federal circuits’ decisions on 
whether the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 permitted federal courts to transfer 
less than a full action (excluding the plaintiff’s claims against other defendants) 
and determined that such a transfer was permitted. Id. at *8–9. After 
determining that a transfer would be in the interests of justice, id. at *9, the 
court severed the plaintiff’s claims against Parsons and transferred those claims 
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, id. 
 2. See id. at *1 (providing case background). 
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prosecution by individual defendants in California, Minnesota, 
Tennessee, Colorado, Florida, New Hampshire, and Texas.3 
Johnson sought a remedy for the wrongs he alleged, but he 
was a pro se litigant who lacked legal training.4 Colorado resident 
and defendant Kim Parsons sought dismissal from the case 
arguing that the California district court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over her.5 The Johnson court noted that, when a 
court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant, it must decide 
whether to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim against that defendant or 
transfer the case to a forum that would have personal jurisdiction 
over that defendant.6 In this case, the court found that Parsons’s 
home state of Colorado would have personal jurisdiction over 
Parsons, but transfer or dismissal would be problematic.7  
Dismissing the claim for lack of personal jurisdiction8 was 
unacceptable because “the statute of limitations would likely bar 
refiling the claims against defendant Parsons in Colorado and 
plaintiff would be unnecessarily required to pay another filing 
fee.”9 Alternatively, the court might have transferred the entire 
action to Colorado under a federal statute that permits the 
transfer of a “civil action” to an appropriate court if “there is a 
                                                                                                     
 3. See id. (listing defendants and summarizing the plaintiff’s claims). 
 4. See id. (describing the plaintiff as pro se); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1341 (9th ed. 2009) (“[A pro se litigant is o]ne who represents oneself in a court 
proceeding without the assistance of a lawyer . . . .”). 
 5. See Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *1 (noting defendant Parsons’s 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)); Int’l 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (explaining the standard 
required for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant). If a defendant is not “present within the territory of the forum, he 
[must] have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the 
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). The Johnson court determined that Parsons lacked 
the necessary minimum contacts with California to justify the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction. See Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *6 (“The court 
concludes that it does not have personal jurisdiction over defendant Parsons.”). 
 6. See Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *8 (“[T]he only issue remaining is 
whether plaintiff’s claims against defendant Parsons should be dismissed or 
transferred to the District of Colorado where Parsons resides.”). 
 7. See id. at *8 (explaining that the court could not transfer the entire 
action and dismissal was not “in the interest of justice”).  
 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (listing a lack of personal jurisdiction as a 
defense that a defendant may raise to a complaint). 
 9. Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *9. 
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want of jurisdiction” and “it is in the interest of justice.”10 The 
Johnson court noted, however, that it “cannot transfer the entire 
action to the District of Colorado because it is obvious that the 
Colorado district court would lack personal jurisdiction over 
several of the defendants.”11  
In attempting to determine how to handle the claim related 
to defendant Parsons, the Johnson court encountered a split 
between the federal circuits about how to handle the dismissal or 
transfer of an action when the court has jurisdiction over only 
some of the claims and defendants.12 The heart of the conflict is a 
disagreement about whether a federal district court may transfer 
less than a full action to another forum where jurisdiction is 
appropriate over only a part of the action.13  
On one side, the D.C. Circuit has found a court may not 
transfer less than an entire legal action.14 On the opposite side, 
the Tenth Circuit,15 Third Circuit,16 and the Federal Circuit17 
have found that a district court may transfer claims, less than an 
entire legal action, where the court lacks jurisdiction over those 
                                                                                                     
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012). 
 11. Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *8. 
 12. See id. (“The Circuits are split regarding whether the language of 28 
U.S.C. § 1631 permits federal courts to partially transfer an action.”). 
 13. See infra Part III.A–B (discussing the circuit split and the primary 
ways partial venue transfer is rationalized). 
 14. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks 
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill's claims . . . .”); infra notes 
156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s views). 
 15. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming a 
district court’s order that transferred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s claims 
because the court effectively severed the problematic claims under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 21 prior to transfer); infra notes 162–70 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s views on the circuit split). 
 16. See D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(permitting “transfer of all or only part of an action”); infra notes 171–75 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s view of the circuit split). 
 17. See United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (holding that “§ 1631 allows for the transfer of less than all of the claims 
in a civil action to the Court of Federal Claims”); infra notes 176–87 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s rationale for allowing 
severance and transfer of a partial action). 
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claims and the associated defendants.18 The circuits that allow 
transfer of less than an entire action disagree regarding the 
justification for transfer.19  
This Note argues that the circuit split regarding whether less 
than a full action may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 163120 
should be resolved by amending the terms “civil action” and 
“case” to include “claims” in §§ 1631, 1404, and 1406 to 
consistently allow district courts to transfer claims that are filed 
in an inconvenient or flawed forum.21 Part II of this Note 
discusses the historical doctrine of forum non conveniens and the 
development of the various statutory mechanisms for 
transferring federal cases between judicial districts, noting the 
major differences between the various statutory means of 
transfer.22 Part III details the circuit split regarding partial 
transfers under § 1631 and the different interpretations of 
§ 1631.23 Part IV discusses the possibilities for resolving the 
circuit split and explains why amending Title 28 is the best 
means for resolving the conflict.24  
This Note demonstrates that § 1631 should be interpreted in 
light of its historical development from the forum non conveniens 
doctrine and transfers effectuated under § 1631 should be treated 
similarly to §§ 1404 (a transfer mechanism for the sake of 
convenience) and 1406 (a transfer mechanism that addresses 
claims filed in a flawed forum).25 These considerations are best 
served by amending the current transfer statutes to reflect 
permissive transfer of claims within an action and detailing a 
clear process for severance and transfer of claims over which a 
district court lacks jurisdiction.26 
                                                                                                     
 18. See infra Part III.A (explaining the circuit split in detail). 
 19. See infra Part III.B (discussing the primary division between the 
circuits on § 1631). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012). 
 21. See infra Part IV (recommending a resolution for the circuit split). 
 22. See infra Part II (discussing the historical and modern venue transfer 
mechanisms). 
 23. See infra Part III (explaining the current circuit split regarding partial 
transfer). 
 24. See infra Part IV (discussing the recommendation to resolve the circuit 
split). 
 25. See infra Part IV.B–C (detailing support for Title 28 amendment). 
 26. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the proposed amendment to Title 28). 
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II. The Development of Transfer Mechanisms and Venue Rules 
Venue rules are designed to assist the federal procedural goal 
of “expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and 
controversies on their merits.”27 While primarily concerned with 
convenience,28 venue rules are also used to correct improperly 
filed actions and prevent injustice that may result when an action 
is dismissed for improper filing.29 A court cannot hear a case or 
issue a binding resolution if it lacks jurisdiction,30 and venue 
rules assist in moving a case to a place where jurisdiction is 
appropriate.31 
There are a variety of statutory transfer mechanisms 
available, but each is designed to serve a specific purpose. The 
most common, or most familiar, venue transfer devices are the 
statutory provisions that provide for a transfer for convenience32 
or a transfer to cure an improper filing.33 Upon a motion to 
                                                                                                     
 27. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962). 
 28. See Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 582 n.7 
(2013) (“‘[The] purpose of statutorily specified venue is to protect the defendant 
against the risk that a plaintiff will select an unfair or inconvenient place of 
trial.’” (quoting Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 183–84 (1979))); 
17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.01[1] (3d ed. 
1999) (“Venue statutes generally are concerned with convenience. They seek to 
channel lawsuits to an appropriately convenient court, given the matters raised 
and the parties involved in an action.”). 
 29. See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466 (noting that § 1406 was enacted to avoid 
“the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their 
actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the 
existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often 
turn”); C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Construction and Application of Federal Statute 
(28 U.S.C. § 1406) Providing for Dismissal or Transfer of Cases for Improper 
Venue, 3 A.L.R. FED. 467, 467 (2014) [hereinafter Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406] 
(discussing the means by which transfer may be accomplished when the original 
forum was not a proper venue). 
 30. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945) (noting 
that due process requires a defendant to have sufficient contacts, ties, or 
relations to a forum to allow the court to make a judgment binding on that 
defendant); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (9th ed. 2009) (describing jurisdiction 
as “[a] court’s power to decide a case or issue a decree”). 
 31. See Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (discussing transfer 
when the original forum was not a proper venue). 
 32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (detailing the standard for transferring a 
case from one proper venue to another for the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses and “in the interest of justice”). 
 33. See id. § 1406 (explaining the standard for transferring a case “laying 
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transfer, the reviewing court has the discretion to dismiss the 
action for refiling in another venue, to transfer the action to a 
new forum, or to deny transfer based upon the “interests of 
justice” or “fairness” that might be served.34 The consequences of 
the mechanism used, however, can vary, particularly with 
regards to the choice-of-law principles that apply.35 
A. Common Law Transfer and Dismissal Mechanisms 
The most prominent venue transfer statutes grew from the 
historical forum non conveniens doctrine.36 The forum non 
conveniens doctrine is a common law development that allows a 
district court to “decline to exercise its jurisdiction, even though 
the court has jurisdiction and venue, when it appears that the 
convenience of the parties and the court and the interests of 
justice indicate that the action should be tried in another 
forum.”37 The doctrine allowed a federal court to dismiss a case if 
                                                                                                     
venue in the wrong division or district”); id. § 1631 (detailing the standard for 
transferring a case where “there is a want of jurisdiction”). 
 34. See id. § 1404 (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice, a district court may transfer . . . .”); id. § 1406 (“The district 
court . . . shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer a case . . . .”); 
id. § 1631 (“[T]he court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such 
action or appeal to any other such court . . . .”).  
 35. See infra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-of-
law rules that apply to transfer effectuated under § 1404); infra notes 100–02 
and accompanying text (discussing choice-of-law rules that apply for a § 1406 
transfer); infra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-of-
law rules that accompany § 1631 transfers). 
 36. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, §§ 111.70–.95 (discussing the forum 
non conveniens doctrine in detail). 
 37. Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 981 F.2d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(citing Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981)); see also Koster v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 532 (1947) (noting that a district 
court may decline to exercise jurisdiction when “a defendant shows much 
harassment and plaintiff’s response . . . indicates such disadvantage as to 
support the inference that the forum he chose would not ordinarily be thought a 
suitable one to decide the controversy”); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 
507 (1947) (“The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may 
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by 
the letter of a general venue statute.”); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.70 
(discussing the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine).  
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there was a more convenient alternative forum, requiring the 
plaintiff to refile the case as a new action elsewhere.38  
Forum non conveniens is a flexible doctrine that considers 
the fairness and convenience of a forum for the parties in each 
individual case.39 The relative convenience of a forum may change 
depending upon the facts of the case, and thus, a “rigid rule to 
govern discretion” is not appropriate and “each case turns on its 
facts.”40 The plaintiff’s choice of forum is given deference and 
“should rarely be disturbed” by dismissal on forum non 
conveniens grounds.41 The Supreme Court has noted, however, 
that “[j]urisdiction and venue requirements are often easily 
satisfied” and plaintiffs will often have an opportunity to choose a 
forum that is inconvenient for defendants.42 Even so, a plaintiff’s 
choice should not be overruled unless the facts of the case 
establish “oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant as to be out 
of all proportion to plaintiff's convenience” or that the “court’s 
own administrative or legal problems” show the chosen forum to 
be inappropriate.43 “In any balancing of conveniences, a real 
showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home 
                                                                                                     
 38. See Howe v. Goldcorp Invest. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(noting that dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine “has the 
practical effect of requiring the plaintiff to file his complaint in a more 
convenient forum elsewhere”); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.70 
(discussing the purpose of the forum non conveniens doctrine). 
 39. See Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (emphasizing 
the Court’s repeated support of “the need to retain flexibility”); Koster v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 531 (1947) (noting that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in relying on defendant’s silence regarding 
convenience of the parties and witnesses, cost of litigation, speed of trial, or 
adequacy of remedy); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (listing 
a variety of interests that might be considered when dismissing under forum 
non conveniens); Windt v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 529 F.3d 183, 188 (3d Cir. 
2008) (noting that a “district court is accorded substantial flexibility in 
evaluating a forum non conveniens motion” (quoting Van Cauwenberghe v. 
Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988))); Thomas T. McClendon, Note, The Power of a 
Suggestion: The Use of Forum Selection Clauses by Delaware Corporations, 69 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067, 2086–87 (2012) (listing nine factors relevant in forum 
non conveniens analysis and noting cases in support). 
 40. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 249 (quoting Williams v. Green Bay & 
W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 557 (1946)). 
 41. Id. at 241. 
 42. Id. at 250.  
 43. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947). 
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forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant 
may have shown.”44  
Historically, dismissal under the forum non conveniens 
doctrine was the only means of protection available to defendants 
if a plaintiff chose to abuse venue provisions.45 This doctrine, 
however, created problems. In some instances, forum non 
conveniens could not be applied due to certain federal law 
restrictions, like the Federal Employers Liability Act.46 The 
doctrine has also been found to be inconvenient and harsh to 
plaintiffs when a court dismissed a case on forum non conveniens 
grounds and the plaintiff was forced to refile in a new forum.47 As 
noted in Johnson v. Mitchell,48 the refiled case may be barred by a 
statute of limitations in the new forum.49 Some courts have 
imposed conditions on forum non conveniens dismissal, 
preventing a defendant from raising statute of limitation, 
jurisdiction, or venue defenses once the plaintiff has refiled the 
case.50 Conditional relief in refiling, however, is not uniformly 
                                                                                                     
 44. Id. 
 45. See Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within 
the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1984) (explaining that until 
1948 “[d]ismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was the only remedy for 
abuse of venue provisions”); Jeremy Jay Butler, Note, Venue Transfer When a 
Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction: Where Are Courts Going With 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1631, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 789, 795 (2006) (discussing the legal background of 
venue transfer). 
 46. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012); see, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 
314 U.S. 44, 48–53 (1941) (denying the applicability of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine because the Federal Employers Liability Act allowed a claim to be filed 
in a limited number of venues and dismissal under forum non conveniens meant 
that the case would be barred upon refiling).  
 47. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 30–31 (1955) (noting that the 
creation of § 1404 was designed to relieve the harsh results of forum non 
conveniens by allowing the opportunity to transfer a case rather than subjecting 
it to dismissal (citing All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d 
Cir. 1952))). 
 48. No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2012). 
 49. See id. at *9 (noting that a statute of limitation may bar refiling after a 
case is dismissed). 
 50. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (requiring three conditions prior to forum non conveniens 
dismissal), aff’d in part, modified in part, 809 F.3d 195, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1987); 
John Bies, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 489, 500–03 
(2000) (discussing the different types of conditions that have been imposed on 
dismissal and listing cases in support). 
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used, and the harsh results of a forum non conveniens dismissal 
are still present. 51 
Use of the forum non conveniens doctrine is no longer as 
prevalent in federal courts due to the creation of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404,52 a new way for a case to be moved from one jurisdiction 
to another for the sake of convenience.53 The development of 
§ 1404 allows for transfer between forums within the federal 
system without the harsh consequences of dismissal.54 After the 
creation of § 1404, the forum non conveniens doctrine is only 
applicable in federal courts when the alternative forum is outside 
the federal court system, for example abroad or a state court.55 
Section 1404(a) is a “codification of the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee forum 
is within the federal system . . . . For the remaining set of cases 
calling for a nonfederal forum, § 1404(a) has no application, but 
                                                                                                     
 51. Bies, supra note 50, at 504–05 (discussing the different circumstances 
when courts have conditioned forum non conveniens dismissals). 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012). 
 53. See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31 (1955) (“An order 
transferring it to another district does not end [a case] but preserves it as 
against the running of the statute of limitations and for all other purposes.” 
(quoting Jiffy Lubricator Co, Inc. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360, 362 
(4th Cir. 1949))).  
 54. See § 1404(a) (“[A] district court may transfer any civil action to any 
other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”); Norwood, 349 
U.S. at 32 (“The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of forum 
non conveniens, dismissal of the action, was eliminated by the provision in 
§ 1404(a) for transfer.”); Howe v. Goldcorp Invest. Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 947 (1st 
Cir. 1991) (noting the difference between application of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine and § 1404); C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Application of 
Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Courts After the 
Enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Authorizing Transfer to Another District, 10 
A.L.R. FED. 352, 352 (2014) [hereinafter Jhong, Forum Non Conveniens] 
(detailing changes to the federal forum non conveniens doctrine after the 
creation of 28 U.S.C. § 1404). 
 55.  See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 
(2007) (explaining that the forum non conveniens doctrine continues to be 
applicable in federal courts only when alternative forum is abroad “and perhaps 
in rare instances where a state or territorial court serves litigational 
convenience best”); U.S. Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449 n.2 
(1994) (“[T]he federal doctrine of forum non conveniens has continuing 
application only in cases where the alternative forum is abroad.”); Piper Aircraft 
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 261 (1981) (dismissing a wrongful death action to be 
refiled in a foreign jurisdiction).  
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the residual doctrine of forum non conveniens” does.56 While 
applied in different litigation circumstances, § 1404(a) and the 
forum non conveniens doctrine entail the same “balancing-of-
interests standard.”57 
Under the forum non conveniens doctrine, a court may, in 
rare instances, maintain a partial action, keeping claims in an 
action while dismissing others.58 Courts have explained that “[i]n 
deciding where a trial should be held the central notions of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens are the convenience of the 
parties and their witnesses and that justice be served.”59 Forum 
non conveniens is a flexible doctrine and “[d]epending upon the 
facts of the particular case, a district court may dismiss part of a 
lawsuit while deciding the merits of other issues.”60 While partial 
dismissal is rooted in the traditional concerns of fairness and 
flexibility that support the forum non conveniens doctrine, it is a 
relatively recent development of the doctrine beginning after the 
creation of § 1404.61 Partial dismissal under the forum non 
conveniens doctrine has also been accepted in some state courts, 
but it is equally rare.62 
                                                                                                     
 56. Atl. Marine Constr. Co v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013) 
(citing Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430). 
 57. Id. (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 58. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505–06 (1947) (noting that the 
use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be rare); Scottish Air Int’l, 
Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1234–35 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(allowing the district court to retain a contempt claim and dismiss other claims 
on forum non conveniens grounds).  
 59. Scottish Air Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d at 1227. 
 60. Id. at 1234 (citing Olympic Corp. v. Societe Generale, 462 F.2d 376, 378 
(2d Cir. 1972)); see also Allarcom Pay TV, Ltd. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 210 
F.3d 381, 381 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Ninth Circuit and others “hold[] 
that district courts have discretion to enter final judgment on some claims and 
dismiss the remainder for forum non conveniens”). 
 61. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (listing cases that have 
allowed partial dismissal; the supporting cases have taken place after the 
creation of § 1404). 
 62. See Field Indus., Inc. v. D.J. Williams, Inc., 470 A.2d 1266, 1266 (Me. 
1984) (affirming dismissal of a counterclaim on forum non conveniens grounds 
while the main claim is retained); United Techs. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins., Co., 
555 N.E.2d 224, 227–29 (Mass. 1990) (noting in dicta that part of an action 
could be dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds if all the issues could not 
be resolved in a single forum); Carwell v. Copeland, 63 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1982) (affirming dismissal of a counterclaim on forum non conveniens 
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B. Statutory Venue Transfer Rules 
1. Transfer for the Sake of Convenience, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 
Use of the forum non conveniens doctrine diminished after 
the adoption of a statutory mechanism for transfer within the 
federal judicial system, namely 28 U.S.C. § 1404.63 Section 1404 
governs venue transfers for the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses and was adopted in 1948.64 This act combined a 
number of preexisting sections65 and was drafted to modify the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to permit the transfer of a case 
from a proper venue to a more convenient venue if it was “in the 
interests of justice.”66 Congress intended to create an easy means 
to transfer cases from an original federal forum to a more 
convenient federal forum.67 The adoption of § 1404 was thought to 
resolve the venue provision issues that arose under the Federal 
                                                                                                     
grounds and resolution of the main claim in summary judgment); Imperial 
Imps. Co. v. Hugo Neu & Sons, Inc., 555 N.Y.S.2d 323, 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) 
(noting that a New York code provision allows that “a court may stay or dismiss 
an action in whole or in part on forum non conveniens grounds upon the motion 
of a party”) . 
 63. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012); see supra notes 52–57 and accompanying text 
(discussing the relationships between the forum non conveniens doctrine and 
§ 1404). 
 64. See Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1404, 62 Stat. 869, 937 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012)) (including the language of 
§ 1404 for the first time); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 65–71 (1949) (discussing 
in detail the legislative history of § 1404). 
 65. See § 1404, 62 Stat. at 937 (consolidating §§ 119 and 163 of title 28, 
U.S.C., 1940 ed.). 
 66. See Jhong, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 54, at 352 (detailing 
changes to the forum non conveniens doctrine after the creation of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404); 15 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3841 
(4th ed. 2010) (noting that the development of § 1404(a) was intended to prevent 
the inconvenience created by the forum non conveniens doctrine and the waste 
of time and money associated with refiling). 
 67. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 522 (1990) (noting that 
Congress responded to the problem of broad venue provisions by permitting 
transfer to a convenient federal court under § 1404(a) (citing Van Dusen v. 
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 634–36 (1964))); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 254 (1981) (stating that § 1404(a) was enacted to allow “easy change of 
venue”); Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616 (noting that § 1404(a) “reflects an increased 
desire to have federal civil suits tried in the federal system at the place called 
for in the particular case by considerations of convenience and justice”). 
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Employers Liability Act68 and to prevent abuse to defendants 
under the new liberal federal joinder rules.69 Section 1404 was 
“drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens,”70 and after its enactment, the forum non conveniens 
doctrine fell out of common use within the federal system.71  
In pertinent part, § 1404 states:  
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the 
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action 
to any other district of division where it might have been 
brought or to any district of division to which all parties have 
consented. 
(b) Upon motion, consent or stipulation of all parties, any 
action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature . . . , may be 
transferred, in the discretion of the court . . . .72 
Section 1404 permits transfer from one proper venue to another 
proper venue for the purposes of convenience and if the interests 
of justice so demand.73 Transfers that take place under this 
section must follow the choice-of-law rules of the transferor 
(sending) court.74 The Erie doctrine generally requires that a 
federal court sitting in diversity apply the law that the local state 
courts would apply to achieve uniformity of result between 
                                                                                                     
 68. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012); see also Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. at 60 
(addressing the interaction of the venue provisions of the Federal Employers 
Liability Act and the new § 1404). 
 69. See Edgar E. Bethell & Herschel Friday, The Federal Judicial Code of 
1948, 3 ARK. L. REV. 146, 150 (1948) (commenting on the major changes 
proposed by the Federal Judicial Code of 1948). 
 70. Hon. Clarence G. Galson, An Introduction to the New Federal Judicial 
Code, 8 F.R.D. 201, 206 (1948). 
 71. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.11 (discussing the purpose of 
a § 1404 transfer); see generally 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3828 
(describing the relationship between the forum non coveniens doctrine and 
§ 1404). 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012). 
 73. See id. (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district of 
division where it might have been brought . . . .”). 
 74. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635–37 (1964) (finding that, 
when a venue transfer takes place under §1404, a transferee court must apply 
the state law that would have been applied if there had been no change of 
venue). 
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federal and state courts.75 Uniformity of results is important 
because it assists in preventing forum shopping and achieving 
equitable administration of the laws, the two major goals of the 
Erie doctrine.76 A case transferred under § 1404 might present an 
opportunity for forum-shopping litigants to benefit if different 
laws applied after transfer.77 Thus, “[a] change of venue under 
§ 1404(a) generally should be, with respect to state law, but a 
change of courtrooms.”78  
Additionally, § 1404 differs from the forum non conveniens 
doctrine because it requires that a full action be transferred if a 
transfer takes place.79 An entire action, however, need not mean 
the case as it was originally filed.80 Several circuits have allowed 
claims to be severed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2181 
and then permitted the severed claim to be transferred to a more 
                                                                                                     
 75. See id. at 638 (“This Court has often formulated the Erie doctrine by 
stating that it establishes the principle of uniformity within a state, and 
declaring that federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases are to apply the 
laws ‘of the state in which they sit.’” (quoting Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 798, 
503 (1941))). 
 76. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (naming these two 
concerns the “twin aims of the Erie rule”). 
 77. See Van Dusen, 367 U.S. at 638 (explaining that the purpose of the Erie 
doctrine would be defeated if defendants were able to gain the benefits of the 
laws of another jurisdiction through transfer). 
 78. Id. at 639. 
 79. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 
1518 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Section 1404(a) only authorizes the transfer of an entire 
action, not individual claims.”); In re Flight Transp. Corp. Sec. Litig., 764 F.2d 
515, 516 (8th Cir. 1985) (“It is well established that the transferor court under 
§ 1404 loses all jurisdiction over a case once transfer has occurred.” (internal 
citation omitted)); Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(noting that § 1404(a) “authorizes the transfer only of an entire action and not of 
individual claims”), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968). 
 80. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“[M]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for 
dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on 
just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a 
party.”); AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holdings Co., v. Bank of Am., N.A., 626 F.3d 
699, 720 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that where certain claims are properly 
severed the result is two or more separate actions); Wyndham Assocs., 398 F.2d 
at 618 (“We believe that where the administration of justice would be materially 
advanced by severance and transfer, a district court may properly sever the 
claims against one or more defendants for the purpose of permitting the transfer 
of the action against the other defendants . . . .”).  
 81. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
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convenient or proper venue.82 In keeping with the traditional 
concerns of fairness and flexibility of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine, it seems as if its statutory progeny is equally open to 
allowing an action to be divided and its various parts to be 
transferred or dismissed if the interests of justice so demand. 
2. Transfer to Cure Filing in an Improper Venue, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 
The current form of 28 U.S.C. § 140683 was also introduced in 
1948.84 Section 1406 is a mechanism that allows a district court 
to transfer a case from an improper venue to a proper venue.85 In 
pertinent part, § 1406 states: “The district court of a district in 
which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district 
shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such 
case to any district or division in which it could have been 
brought.”86 Section 1406 includes a discretionary element, 
allowing a court the choice of dismissing or transferring the case 
“in the interest of justice” if the original venue was improper87 or 
if venue and personal jurisdiction are lacking.88 But if a party 
                                                                                                     
 82. See AEP Energy Servs. Gas Holdings Co., 626 F.3d at 720 (“Where 
certain claims are properly severed, the result is that there are then two or more 
separate ‘actions,’ and the district court may, pursuant to § 1404(a), transfer 
certain of such separate actions while retaining jurisdiction of others.”); Toro Co. 
v. Alsop, 565 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that the district court had 
the power to sever a single count from a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 21 and transfer the count and a counterclaim to another federal 
district court); see, e.g., Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 28, 33–
34 (3d Cir. 1993) (accepting that severance and transfer may be used in cases 
where the defendants are only indirectly connected, but denying that 
circumstance in the present case). 
 83. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012). 
 84. See Judicial Code of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1406, 62 Stat. 869, 937 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012)) (stating the text of § 1406 for 
the first time). 
 85. See 28 U.S.C. §1406 (providing means to correct an improper venue). 
 86. Id. § 1406(a). 
 87. See id. § 1391 (explaining that proper venue is a judicial district where 
all defendants reside, where a “substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred,” or where “any defendant is subject to the 
court’s personal jurisdiction” if the other two provisions are not satisfied). 
 88. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (“The language of 
§ 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however 
wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the 
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seeks to change venue under § 1406, and the dispute is not 
waived, the court does not have the liberty to keep the case 
because it is not a proper venue.89 Similarly, if venue is proper, 
then the motion to transfer under § 1406 must generally be 
denied.90 The definitions of a “proper” or “improper venue” have 
been extended in some circuits to include transfer where venue 
may be appropriate in the original forum, but some other obstacle 
stands in the way of adjudication on the merits.91 For example, 
some courts have found that an “improper venue” may exist when 
the statutory venue provisions are met but the court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over defendants.92 Thus, a motion to 
transfer under § 1406 must be denied when venue is proper and 
the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.93 
Prior to the enactment of § 1406, dismissal was the only 
option for a court faced with a case filed in an improper venue.94 
                                                                                                     
court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or 
not.”).  
 89. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court . . . shall dismiss, or if it be 
in the interest of justice transfer such case . . . .” (emphasis added)); Jhong, 28 
U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (discussing the means by which transfer is 
accomplished under § 1406). 
 90. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (“A prerequisite to 
invoking § 1406(a) is that the venue chosen by the plaintiff is improper.”); 
Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (discussing the means by which 
transfer is accomplished under § 1406 and listing cases in support).  
 91. See Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653, 656 (8th Cir. 1967) (noting 
that “the first forum chosen is improper in the sense that the litigation may not 
proceed there”); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813, 815 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The 
statute does not refer to ‘wrong’ venue, but rather to venue laid in a ‘wrong 
division or district.’ We conclude that a district is ‘wrong’ within the meaning of 
§ 1406 whenever there exists and ‘obstacle [to] . . . an expeditious and orderly 
adjudication’ on the merits.”); Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 
n.12 (noting that the term “improper venue” has been interpreted broadly). 
 92. See Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1988) (noting that 
§ 1406 has been interpreted “to afford broad remedial relief” and listing circuits 
in agreement); Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (noting that the 
term “improper venue” has been expanded and listing cases in support). 
 93. See Jhong, 28 U.S.C. § 1406, supra note 29, at 467 (noting that § 1406 
is not concerned with the convenience of the parties, only whether venue is 
proper); supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (discussing the expansive 
definition of “improper venue”). 
 94. See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 430 (1965) (stating 
that § 1406(a) prevents “the unfairness of barring a plaintiff’s action solely 
because a prior timely action is dismissed for improper venue after the 
applicable statute of limitations has run”); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 
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Section 1406 is a way to transfer a case, rather than to dismiss it, 
and “avoid . . . the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs 
from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an 
erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact 
of the kind upon which venue provisions would turn.”95 Similar to 
§ 1404, § 1406 was designed to remove “whatever obstacles may 
impede an expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and 
controversies on their merits.”96 The similarity of purpose and of 
result between § 1404 and § 1406, however, has created 
significant confusion.97 While the line between the two statutes 
can become blurred, the two are mutually exclusive.98 As one 
court explains, “Section 1404(a) permits transfer of a civil action 
to any other district in which it could have been brought, and 
refers to a civil action in which venue is properly laid . . . . Section 
1406(a) pertains to transfer of a case laying venue in the ‘wrong 
district.’”99  
In general, when a case is transferred under § 1406 to correct 
filing in an improper venue, the law of the transferee (receiving) 
court will apply.100 The different choice-of-law rules that apply 
                                                                                                     
463, 466 (1962) (noting that the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) was to avoid 
injustices such as plaintiff “losing a substantial part of its cause of action under 
the statute of limitations” because it made a mistake in venue). 
 95. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466; see 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 
(detailing the goals of § 1406(a)). 
 96. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466. 
 97. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (noting that a number of 
courts have said that either § 1404 or § 1406 may be used a basis for transfer). 
 98. Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1147 (5th Cir. 
1984) (noting that § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) are “both short, apparently clear, and 
seemingly mutually exclusive”); Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1104 
(5th Cir. Unit A June 1981) (explaining that “sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) 
would appear to apply in two mutually exclusive situations” (citing Goldlawr, 
369 U.S at 466–67)). 
 99. Liaw Su Teng, 743 F.2d at 1147. 
 100. See Eggleton v. Plasser & Theurer Exp. Von Bahnbaumaschinen 
Gessellschaft, MBH, 495 F.3d 582, 588 (8th Cir. 2007) (relying on precedent that 
requires the law of the transferee court to apply when a case is transferred 
under § 1406 (internal citations omitted)); GBJ Corp. v. E. Ohio Paving Co., 139 
F.3d 1080, 1084 (6th Cir. 1998) (“When a case is transferred [under § 1406(a)], 
the choice-of-law rules of the transferee court apply.”); Schaeffer v. Vill. of 
Ossining, 58 F.3d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Following a section 1406(a) 
transfer . . . ‘the transferee court should apply whatever law it would have 
applied had the action been properly commenced there.’” (internal citations 
omitted)); Myelle v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 57 F.3d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting 
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when a case is transferred under § 1404 and under § 1406 are 
designed to “prevent forum shopping” and to deny any extra 
advantage to a party who would not have been entitled to those 
advantages if the case was brought in the proper forum.101 A 
plaintiff should only gain the benefit of the law that would apply 
in the original forum if the venue is proper and the court has 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.102 
Again, similar to transfers effectuated under § 1404, a court 
generally may not transfer less than a full action in a venue 
transfer under § 1406, but certain claims may be severed from 
the action and transferred on their own.103 Several courts have 
severed claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21104 and 
transferred those claims to a district where venue was proper.105 
                                                                                                     
that “a district court receiving a case under the mandatory transfer provisions of 
§ 1406(a) must apply the law of the state in which it is held rather than the law 
of the transferor district court”); Tel-Phonic Servs., Inc. v. TBS Int’l, Inc., 975 
F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1992) (“When a case is transferred from a district in 
another circuit, the precedent of the circuit court encompassing the transferee 
district court applies to the case on matters of federal law.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
 101. See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining the reason that different choice-of-law rules would apply depending 
upon the venue transfer statute invoked and listing cases in support). 
 102. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (explaining the 
interrelation between venue transfer and choice-of-law rules). 
 103. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953) 
(noting that Congress, in creating the limited venue statute 15 U.S.C. § 15, 
must have contemplated that venue might not be appropriate as to all 
defendants of a single action and that “such proceedings might be severed and 
transferred or filed in separate districts originally”); In re Vitamins Antitrust 
Litig., 270 F. Supp. 2d 15, 37 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding the severance and transfer 
of certain claims to a proper forum is appropriate under both § 1404 and 
§ 1406); Doelcher Prods., Inc. v. Hydrofoil Int’l, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 666, 669 (D. 
Md. 1989) (severing a defendant from the plaintiff’s case and transferring the 
remaining claims to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York); ABC Great States, Inc. v. Globe Ticket Co., 310 F. Supp. 739, 744 (N.D. 
Ill. 1970) (“[T]he conclusion that venue is improper in this District does not 
require dismissal of the action against [two defendants]—they may be severed 
from the main actions, and their actions may be transferred ‘in the interest of 
justice’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) . . . .”). 
 104. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 105. See Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 762 F. Supp. 2d 18, 32 (D.D.C. 
2011) (severing certain claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and 
transferring those claims to the South District of New York); O’Shatz v. Bailey, 
220 F. Supp. 444, 446–48 (D. Md. 1963) (sustaining a motion to transfer for 
improper venue, severing certain defendants from the action, and transferring 
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Severance and transfer of claims under § 1406 appears to be more 
widely accepted than severance and transfer under § 1404 and 
began shortly after the adoption of § 1406.106 
3. Transfer to Cure Lack of Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1631 
Federal statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1631,107 governs 
when a venue transfer is effectuated for lack of jurisdiction:  
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court 
finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in 
the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any 
other such court in which the action or appeal could have been 
brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or 
appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the 
court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was 
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is 
transferred.108 
Section 1631 was enacted as part of the Federal Courts 
Improvement Act of 1982109 to cure subject matter jurisdiction 
problems that arise when a case was filed in the wrong court.110 
                                                                                                     
the claims to the Eastern District of New York); United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency v. Glass Prod. Methods, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 248, 250 
(S.D.N.Y. 1956) (severing the action as to certain defendants and transferring 
some of the claims to the District Court of Connecticut). 
 106. See Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 384 (noting that Congress 
must have contemplated the possibility of severance and transfer in cases where 
venue may not be appropriate as to all defendants); United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency, 143 F. Supp. at 250 (severing the action as to certain 
defendants and transferring some of the claims to the District Court of 
Connecticut). 
 107. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 1631, 96 Stat. 25, 55 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 
1631 (2012)).  
 110. See Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting that 
Congress crafted § 1631 to ensure that litigants were not deprived of a remedy 
due to error or procedural technicality resulting from some statutory 
uncertainty and to prevent duplicative litigation that would result if litigants 
were required to file in two courts to ensure jurisdiction); United States v. Am. 
River Transp., Inc., 150 F.R.D. 587, 591 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (“The impetus for this 
legislation was the jurisdictional confusion caused by the creation of specialized 
federal courts, such as the Court of Claims, which have jurisdiction over certain 
matters.”); Mortensen v. Wheel Horse Prods., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 85, 86–87 
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Section 1631 was particularly necessary after the decision in 
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,111 which found that transfer for lack of 
venue or lack of personal jurisdiction could be effectuated under 
§ 1406,112 but left no avenue for transfer when a court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over an action.113 Section 1631 was 
designed to save the expenditure of time and money in refiling an 
action after dismissal and to prevent a refiled claim from being 
barred by expiration of the statute of limitations period.114  
Section 1631 is a broad grant of authority to transfer a case 
where “there is a want of jurisdiction.”115 The term “jurisdiction,” 
as used in the statute, has created some controversy.116 Some 
courts have found that § 1631 should be used only in cases where 
subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.117 Other courts have 
                                                                                                     
(N.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that § 1631 was created to cure filing confusion when 
“two or more federal courts” have jurisdiction and the “wasteful and costly 
practice of filing an action in several courts to ensure that the litigant will not 
be left ‘without a remedy because of a lawyer’s error or a technicality of 
procedure.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 11 (1981), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 21)).  
 111. 369 U.S. 463 (1962). 
 112. See id. at 466 (“The language of § 1406(a) is amply broad enough to 
authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff may have been in 
filing his case as to venue, whether the court in which it was filed had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants or not.”). 
 113. See 14D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3827 (noting that a court was 
not permitted to transfer an action under §§ 1404 or 1406 unless it had subject 
matter jurisdiction). 
 114. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 
40. 
 115. See Ross v. Colo. Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822 F.2d 1524, 1526 (10th 
Cir. 1987) (noting that “Congress gave broad authority [under § 1631] to permit 
the transfer of an action between any two federal courts”); McLaughlin v. Arco 
Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 436, 429 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that § 1631 “is broadly 
drafted to allow transfer between any two Federal courts”).  
 116. See Cimon v. Gaffney, 401 F.3d 1, 7 n.21 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that 
there is a debate regarding what the term “jurisdiction” means in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1631 and listing cases in support); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.51[2] 
n.7 (listing cases in support of transfer where subject matter jurisdiction is 
lacking); id. § 111.51[3] n.8 (listing cases that have found transfer under § 1631 
to be proper where personal jurisdiction is lacking). 
 117. See McTyre v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 102, 105 (D.N.J. 
1990) (finding that § 1631 applies only when subject matter jurisdiction is 
lacking in the transferor court); Levy v. Pyramid Co. of Ithaca, 687 F. Supp. 48, 
51 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that § 1631 “was only intended to apply to cases in 
which the transferor court lacks subject matter jurisdiction”), aff’d, 871 F.2d 9 
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interpreted the statute to also authorize a transfer to cure lack of 
personal jurisdiction or improper venue.118 The language of the 
statute appears to be broad enough to address defects in both 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but the legislative 
history of § 1631 expressly refers to subject matter jurisdiction 
and does not mention defects in personal jurisdiction.119 Limiting 
transfer under § 1631 to instances where a case lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction appears to be the correct reading and in line 
with Congress’s intent, particularly in light of the Supreme 
Court’s holding that transfer for lack of venue and personal 
jurisdiction may be accomplished under § 1406.120  
When a case is transferred for lack of jurisdiction, the choice-
of-law rules of the transferee (receiving) court will apply to the 
case.121 Much like in the case of a transfer effectuated under 
§ 1406, applying the rules of the transferee court helps to 
discourage forum shopping and prevents either party from 
gaining advantages they otherwise would not have had if the case 
had been brought in the appropriate forum originally.122 The 
                                                                                                     
(2d Cir. 1989); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.51[2] (describing the 
debate about whether § 1631 addresses subject matter jurisdiction, personal 
jurisdiction, or both); Jeffrey W. Tayon, Federal Transfer Statute: 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1631, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 189, 224 (1987) (describing the legislative history of 
§ 1631 and explaining that “it appears to be directed to correcting subject matter 
jurisdictional defects”).  
 118. See Ross, 822 F.2d at 1527 (allowing a transfer under § 1631 when the 
transferor court lacked personal jurisdiction); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, 
§ 111.51[3] (citing cases in support of transfers effectuated under § 1631 for lack 
of personal jurisdiction).  
 119. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 
40 (noting that the proposed § 1631 would authorize a court to transfer a case 
that had been improperly filed to a court where subject matter jurisdiction was 
proper); Tayon, supra note 117, at 224 (discussing the meaning of the term 
“jurisdiction” in § 1631). 
 120. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962) (“The language of 
§ 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however 
wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the 
court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or 
not.”). 
 121. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785, 793–94 (10th Cir. 
1998) (noting that when a case is transferred under §1631 then the transferee 
court’s choice-of-law principles will be applied). 
 122. See Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(explaining that different choice-of-law rules would apply depending upon the 
venue transfer statute invoked and listing cases in support). 
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federal circuits are currently divided regarding a court’s ability to 
transfer less than an entire action under § 1631.123  
4. Transfer and Consolidation in Multidistrict Litigation, 28 
U.S.C. § 1407 
There is also a statutory provision for addressing large legal 
actions that are filed in a number of different venues. While 28 
U.S.C. § 1407124 does not derive from the same historical roots as 
the other sections mentioned, it is a representation of the goals of 
the judiciary in creating simple, clear, and efficient venue rules to 
address new challenges in litigation.125 Congress has created a 
special legislative provision to address transfers in multidistrict 
litigation: a case may be transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 when 
it is a civil action “involving one or more common questions of fact 
that are pending in different districts.”126 The Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation effectuates transfers if it determines that 
“transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of 
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient 
conduct of such actions.”127 The advent of large multidistrict tort, 
patent, antitrust, and securities cases prompted Congress to 
“provide judicial machinery to transfer, for coordinated or 
consolidated pretrial proceedings, civil actions, having one or 
                                                                                                     
 123. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 111.51[2] nn.7.0.2 & 7.1 (noting 
the existence of a circuit split with the D.C. Circuit on one side and the Third, 
Tenth, and Federal Circuit on the other); infra Part III.A (discussing the circuit 
split). 
 124. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 125. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMITTEE REPORT, 
PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES, reprinted in Hon. 
Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in Long Cases: A Commentary on the Report 
Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases Adopted by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, September 26, 1951, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62–
84 (1952) (reviewing problems presented by an increase in complex cases and 
recommending certain judicial solutions); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GROUP 
ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIGATION, HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED 
PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES, 25 F.R.D. 351, 373–432 
(1960) (explaining non-mandatory procedures for addressing complex cases); 15 
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 3861 (discussing the historical development of 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation). 
 126. 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 
 127. Id. 
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more common questions of fact, pending in different judicial 
districts.”128 Section 1407 was enacted in 1968 to provide 
“centralized management” of pretrial proceedings in multidistrict 
litigation to “assure just and efficient conduct.”129 It is important 
to note that a transfer under § 1407 is for pretrial proceedings, 
not trial or final disposition of the case,130 although a transferee 
court does have the power to handle dispositive pretrial 
motions.131  
When presented with a case involving a number of claims, 
cross-claims, counterclaims, or third-party claims, the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has the authority to separate 
any claim from the action, and it may transfer the claims or 
remand them,132 including claims that lack common questions of 
fact.133 The Panel’s discretion to separate claims is limited, 
however, and it may not sever claims that share a common 
question of fact or assign them to different courts.134 The Panel is 
not designed to address substantive or procedural matters, but 
only to determine whether actions ought to be transferred for 
                                                                                                     
 128. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at *1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1898, 1898. 
 129. Id. at *2–3. 
 130. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“[E]ach action so transferred shall be 
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings 
to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously 
terminated . . . .”); H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at *3 (“[T]he bill provides for the 
transfer of venue to an action for the limited purpose of conducting coordinated 
pretrial proceedings.”). 
 131. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (providing that a court may address pretrial 
proceedings); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 112.03 n.74 (listing cases in 
support of the proposition that a transferee court may handle dispositive 
motions). 
 132. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“[T]he panel may separate any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims before 
the remainder of the action is remanded.”); 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, 
§ 112.02 n.12 (citing cases in support of the Panel’s authority to separate 
claims). 
 133. See In re 1980 Decennial Census Adjustment Litig., 506 F. Supp. 648, 
650–51 (J.P.M.L. 1981) (requiring that “claims to be returned to the transferor 
court involve little or no factual overlap with the claims to be transferred”); In re 
Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 510 F. Supp. 1220, 1227 (J.P.M.L. 1979) 
(requiring transfer of multiple claims because there was some factual overlap 
and “substantial overlapping discovery [would] be required”). 
 134. See 17 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 112.02 n.14 (citing cases in 
support). 
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pretrial purposes and whether actions previously transferred 
should be remanded for trial.135 Similar to transfers conducted 
under § 1404, cases transferred under § 1407 are governed by the 
choice-of-law rules of the transferor court.136 
C. Transfer After Severance Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 21 
Prior to any partial transfer, the offending claims or 
defendants must be separated from the action as a whole.137 The 
most common means for separating claims and defendants within 
a federal action is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.138 Rule 21 
provides that: “On motion or on its own, the court may at any 
time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever 
any claim against a party.”139 If less than a full action is to be 
transferred, the transferring claim and related defendants must 
first be severed from the original action.140 Upon severance under 
Rule 21, the single claim becomes a discrete and independent suit 
and proceeds as a separate action.141 
                                                                                                     
 135. See id. § 112.02(d) (discussing the role of the Panel and citing cases in 
support). 
 136. See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633–34 (1964) (determining 
that the court should use the choice-of-law rules of the original court if the case 
was filed in a proper venue); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 
496 (1941) (“The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in 
Delaware must confirm to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts.”); Andrew 
D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 766–80 (2012) (discussing 
the legal development of choice-of-law rules and how they apply when a case is 
transferred to a proper venue). 
 137. See 4 MOORE ET AL, supra note 28, § 21.06 n.13 (listing cases in support 
of the requirement for severance prior to transfer). 
 138. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (providing for the severance of parties and 
claims); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (discussing how Rule 21 
severance is used); id. § 1682 (“The scope of application of Rule 21 is extremely 
broad and covers any civil action in the federal courts.”). 
 139. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 140. See 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 n.13 (noting that severance 
is a prerequisite for transfer of a claim and listing cases in support); 7 WRIGHT 
ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (explaining the use of Rule 21 as a means to allow 
claims and cases to go forward towards trial).  
 141. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21 (“The court may also sever any claim against a 
party.”); 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 (listing cases in support); 7 
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The main focus of Rule 21 and its historical predecessors has 
been to correct misjoinder or nonjoinder of parties.142 District 
courts have broad discretion to address severance questions, and 
the ability to sever claims and parties has been extended to a 
broad variety of scenarios.143 To determine whether severance 
should be granted, some courts consider whether the issues 
presented are “significantly different,” whether the issues rely on 
different witnesses or proof, or whether a party may be 
prejudiced if severance is denied.144 All courts, however, seem to 
agree that “[t]he decision of whether to grant severance is 
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.”145 
Like the transfer mechanisms noted above, severance is a 
preferred remedy and is undertaken to prevent prejudice to a 
party that may suffer due to a dismissal.146 Rule 21 may be 
                                                                                                     
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (“Once a claim has been severed . . . it 
proceeds as a discrete unit until its own final judgment, from which an appeal 
may be taken.”). 
 142. See FED. EQUITY R. 43–44 (1912), reprinted in JAMES L. HOPKINS, THE 
NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 238–39 (1913) (noting that a district court has 
discretionary power to dismiss an action or allow addition of necessary parties); 
7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (noting that the primary use of Rule 21 
has been in the context of joinder of parties); Daniel K. Hopkinson, The New 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Compared with the Former Equity Rules and 
the Wisconsin Code, 43 MARQ. L. REV. 170 (noting that Rule 21’s joinder rules 
are “much more liberal than Equity Rules 43 and 44” which dealt entirely with 
misjoinder and nonjoinder). 
 143. See 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 (explaining that the decision 
to sever is “committed to the sound discretion of the court,” and listing cases in 
support); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (noting the broad discretion of 
district courts in severing claims and parties). 
 144. See German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1385, 1400 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[C]ourts generally consider (1) whether the issues sought to be 
tried separately are significantly different . . . , (2) whether the separable issues 
require the testimony of different witnesses and different documentary proof, (3) 
whether the party opposing the severance will be prejudiced if it is granted and 
(4) whether the party requesting the severance will be prejudiced . . . .”). 
 145. New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1082 (2d Cir. 
1988); see 4 MOORE ET AL., supra note 28, § 21.06 (explaining that the decision to 
sever is “committed to the sound discretion of the court” and listing cases in 
support). 
 146. See Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting 
that discretion under Rule 21 includes consideration of what is “just” and when 
there is a choice between dismissal or severance, severance is preferable); 
DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 846 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Although a district 
court has discretion to choose either severance or dismissal in remedying 
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employed to remove non-diverse parties when federal jurisdiction 
relies on diversity of citizenship.147 Severance has been found to 
be appropriate in cases when separate treatment of an unrelated 
claim was found to be in the interests of justice.148 Claims have 
also been severed when venue is improper for some but not all 
defendants and the claims are separable.149 Even where venue is 
proper, claim severance has been found to be appropriate when 
the forum is inconvenient for a party and the claim could be 
separated from the rest of the action.150 In rarer circumstances, 
claim severance has also been found appropriate when it would 
enable a defendant to implead a plaintiff under Rule 14,151 or 
when a private individual is joined as a codefendant with the 
United States in actions where the United States must be sued 
alone.152 
                                                                                                     
misjoinder, it is permitted under Rule 21 to opt for the latter only if ‘just’—that 
is, if doing so ‘will not prejudice any substantial right.’” (internal citations 
omitted)); Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]n 
formulating a remedy for a misjoinder the judge is required to avoid gratuitous 
harm to the parties, including the misjoined party.”). 
 147. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 832 (1989) 
(“[I]t is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority to allow a 
dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time, even after judgment 
has been rendered.”). 
 148. See United States v. O’Neil, 709 F.2d 361, 369–72 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(allowing severance of counterclaims and crossclaims); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra 
note 66, § 1689 (listing cases in support). 
 149. See 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (listing cases that support 
severance for venue reasons). 
 150. See id. (listing cases that support severance for convenience). 
 151. See Sporia v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 143 F.2d 105, 107–08 (3d Cir. 1944) 
(allowing severance for the purpose of impleader, noting that later consolidation 
under Rule 42 was still possible); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1689 (listing 
cases in support of the use of severance for impleader). 
 152. See Lynn v. United States, 110 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1940) (finding 
that “in the spirit of Rule 21,” a claim arising under the Tucker Act should not 
be dismissed but that the claims should be severed); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 
66, § 1689 (discussing instances when severance has been found to be 
appropriate). 
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III. Disagreement on Transfer of Less Than a Full Action Under 
§ 1631 
There is currently a circuit split regarding whether a court 
may transfer less than a full action under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
Similar to transfers effectuated under § 1404 and § 1406, the 
Third, Tenth, and Federal Circuits have embraced transfer of less 
than a full action under § 1631 if the interest of justice demands 
it.153 The D.C. Circuit, however, has denied transfer of less than 
an entire action because of the precise wording of § 1631.154 The 
key division between the circuits is the proper interpretation of 
the term “action” within the statute.155 
A. The Circuit Split 
The D.C. Circuit has found that a court may not transfer less 
than an entire legal action.156 In Hill v. United States Air Force,157 
the D.C. Circuit considered whether the D.C. District Court erred 
in failing to transfer a claim, separated from the full action, 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.158 The D.C. Circuit found that the district 
court’s actions were acceptable because § 1631 “directs a court to 
                                                                                                     
 153. See infra notes 162–87 and accompanying text (detailing one side of the 
circuit split). 
 154. See infra notes 156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. 
Circuit’s reasoning). 
 155. See infra Part III.B (discussing the statutory interpretation 
disagreement). 
 156. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks 
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill’s claims . . . .”); Halim v. 
Donovan, No. 12-00384, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91862, at *6 (D.D.C. July 1, 
2013) (“[I]t is not clear to the [c]ourt that it would have the authority to 
effectuate a piecemeal transfer of Plaintiffs’ ‘case’ against the City Defendants, 
while retaining jurisdiction over Halim’s claims against HUD.”); cf. Bailey v. 
Fulwood, 780 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting that the court “may 
not transfer the habeas claims while maintaining the Privacy Act claims, 
because they arise in the same ‘action,’” but allowing the claims to be severed 
into separate actions).  
 157. 795 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 158. See id. at 1070 (“[W]e conclude that the District Court did not err in 
failing to transfer this case to the District Court in New Mexico pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1631 (1982).”). 
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transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks jurisdiction, rather than 
an individual claim . . . .”159 The D.C. Circuit has generally 
adopted a “strong policy against piecemeal” cases or appeals.160 
The court, however, has recognized a small exception when it has 
dismissed certain claims, transferred the remainder of the case 
elsewhere, and no other review of the dismissed claims was 
possible.161 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Tenth Circuit has 
found that transfer of less than an entire action under § 1631 
may be appropriate when a district court severs, or demonstrates 
the intent to sever, the transferred claims from the remaining 
action.162 When a claim may be severed, the resulting pieces may 
be disposed of as the court sees fit.163 The court borrows this 
reasoning from its prior decisions regarding partial transfers 
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. (noting that when a federal court finds it lacks jurisdiction and that 
another federal court has authority to hear the case, “the first federal court 
must transfer the case to the proper court” (citing Ctr. for Nuclear 
Responsibility v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 781 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))); see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. United States, 780 
F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[W]here a court finds that it lacks jurisdiction, it 
must transfer such action to the proper court . . . .”). 
 160. Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 161. See Murthy v. Vilsac, 609 F.3d 460, 463–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that an exception to the court’s view of partial transfers may exist). The D.C. 
Circuit exercised appellate review of a dismissed Title VII claim, a portion of a 
case that was previously transferred to the Court of Federal Claims, because of 
the “specialized jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal 
Circuit’s treatment of partial transfers, neither the federal district court nor the 
Court of Federal Claims could exercise jurisdiction over all the claims” in 
plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 464 (citing Greenhill v. Spellings, 482 F.3d 569, 574 
(D.C. Cir. 2007)).  
 162. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming 
the district court’s order to transfer some, but not all, of plaintiff’s claims 
because the court effectively severed the problematic claims under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 21 prior to transfer); Salazar v. Ashcroft, 116 Fed. App’x 167, 
167 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that it lacked jurisdiction over certain 
claims because the district court intended to sever those claims under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 21 and transferred the claims under § 1631 to the Ninth 
Circuit); Burkins v. United States, 112 F.3d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(remanding case to the district court for severance under Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 21 and transfer to the Federal Claims Court).  
 163. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 
1519–20 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that when an action is severed into various 
new and separate actions the court has discretion to treat the new actions 
distinctly if appropriate). 
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under § 1404: “§ 1404’s authorization for transfer of ‘any civil 
action’ did not allow a district court to transfer a portion of the 
action in the absence of a severance under Rule 21.”164 A 
severance, the Tenth Circuit has noted, creates “two separate 
actions . . . ; a district court may transfer one action while 
retaining jurisdiction over the other.”165 The district court’s 
transfer order, however, must “clearly indicate[] that the district 
court intended to create two separate actions.”166 The Tenth 
Circuit has found severance and transfer under § 1631 to be 
discretionary and only to be used in limited circumstances.167 The 
Tenth Circuit has noted that it is “aware of no authority even 
permitting, much less requiring, a district court to unilaterally 
split up an action and transfer the resultant components to 
diverse jurisdictions” under § 1631.168 Severance and transfer 
should be undertaken only “in the interests of justice,”169 and 
even then, the Tenth Circuit has recognized that such an action is 
within the court’s discretion.170 
                                                                                                     
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. (citing Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 618 (2d Cir. 
1968)). 
 166. McGlamery, 74 F.3d at 222 (citing, in contrast, Chrysler Credit, 928 
F.2d at 1519, which discussed an order that could not be construed as a Rule 21 
severance: “[N]owhere in the order does the court refer to Rule 21 or imply that 
two separate actions are being created”). 
 167. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1222–23 & n.15 (10th Cir. 2006)) 
(explaining that § 1631 should be considered to cure deficiencies related to 
personal jurisdiction, but that in the present case there was no single court 
where the action could be transferred with any “assurance that jurisdiction 
would have been proper”). 
 168. See Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1249–50 (exploring a requirement to sever a 
claim and transfer it to another forum). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012); see also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 
1222–23 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that “[a]lthough both § 1406(a) and § 1631 
contain the word ‘shall,’ [the court has] interpreted the phrase ‘if it is in the 
interest of justice’ to grant the district court discretion in making a decision to 
transfer an action or instead to dismiss the action without prejudice” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 170. See Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1249 (“We are aware of no authority even 
permitting, much less requiring, a district court to unilaterally split up an 
action and transfer the resultant components to diverse jurisdictions under the 
auspices of § 1631.”) 
2688 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2659 (2014) 
The Third Circuit has interpreted § 1631 “to permit the 
transfer of all or only part of an action.”171 The Third Circuit has 
found that transfers completed under § 1631 are comparable to 
those completed under § 1404.172 Similar to the Tenth Circuit, the 
Third Circuit observed that “where a case could have been 
brought against some defendants in the transferee district, the 
claims against those defendants may be severed and transferred 
while the claims against the remaining defendants, for whom 
transfer would not be proper, are retained.”173 The court has 
noted that such a transfer is not a partial transfer but the 
creation of what may be regarded as “two or more separate and 
independent actions.”174 Prior to transfer, however, a district 
court should “weigh the factors favoring transfer against the 
potential inefficiency of requiring similar or overlapping issues to 
be litigated in two separate forums.”175  
The Federal Circuit has completed a full analysis of § 1631 
and has found partial venue transfers to be appropriate.176 While 
                                                                                                     
 171. D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009); see 
Miller v. United States, 753 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing partial transfer, 
but without an analysis of its decision to do so); Patchen v. McGuire, No. 11-
5388, 2012 WL 4473233, *15–18 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (recognizing that the 
court may transfer less than a full action should a claim or defendant be 
severable); Liberi v. Taitz, No. 09-1898, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54695, at *7 n.4 
(E.D. Pa. June 4, 2010) (relying on the D’Jamoos decision regarding § 1631). 
 172. See D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 110 (discussing the comparability of § 1631 
and § 1404 and the similarity of the means by which transfer is accomplished). 
 173. Id. (citing White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 
1999)). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 111 (citing White, 199 F.3d at 144–45); see Sunbelt Corp. v. Nobel, 
Denton & Assocs., 5 F.3d 28, 33–34 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a court “‘should 
not sever if the defendant over whom jurisdiction is retained is so involved in 
the controversy to be transferred that partial transfer would require the same 
issues to be litigated in two places’” (quoting Liaw Su Teng v. Saarup Shipping 
Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1148 (5th Cir. 1984))). 
 176. See United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (holding that “§ 1631 allows for the transfer of less than all of the claims 
in a civil action to the Court of Federal Claims”); see, e.g., Griffin v. United 
States, 590 F.3d 1291, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (upholding transfer of a single 
claim within a larger action (citing Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1089)); James v. 
Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that division of plaintiff’s 
claims may be acceptable but not discussing the issue fully); Galloway Farms, 
Inc. v. United States, 834 F.2d 998, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that “[c]ourts 
have exercised their §1631 transfer powers but not usually, or preferably, in the 
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the Federal Circuit differs from the other circuits because it is a 
court of limited subject matter jurisdiction, its analysis of this 
issue is thorough.177 Additionally, as a court of limited 
jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit is often confronted with cases 
where it may lack subject matter jurisdiction over some of the 
claims in an action.178 Looking specifically at the language of the 
statute, the Federal Circuit has determined that while there was 
support for the notion that § 1631 refers only to the transfer of 
“civil actions”179 the language was not dispositive of Congress’s 
intention regarding severance and transfer of an action under 
§ 1631.180 The Federal Circuit found that the language of § 1631 
should be interpreted in light of an additional statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292,181 which grants the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction 
over an appeal “granting or denying, in whole or in part, a motion 
to transfer an action” to the Court of Federal Claims under 
§ 1631.182 The court “read § 1292(d)(4)(A) as reflective of 
Congress’s intention in § 1631 to permit the transfer of less than 
all the claims in an action.”183 Such a reading provides a remedy 
for a litigant who mistakenly files his or her case in a court that 
lacks jurisdiction.184 Additionally, such a reading appears to be 
                                                                                                     
form of bifurcation of claims,” but declining to transfer any claims in the case); 
Carter v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 365, 370 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (“The Federal 
Circuit has held that this statute permits the transfer of less than all the claims 
in an action.” (citing Cnty. of Cook, 70 F.3d at 1089)). 
 177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012) (detailing the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Circuit); Brian H. Redmond, Annotation, Jurisdiction of the United States Court 
of Appeal for Federal Circuit Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 and 1295, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
694, 694 (2014) (discussing the scope the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction). 
 178. See supra note 176 (listing cases where the Federal Circuit had 
jurisdiction over only part of the claims). 
 179. See Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1088 (relying upon the use of the term 
“civil action” in Rules 2, 3, and 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 180. See id. (referring to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A) (2012) for insight on the 
term “civil action”). 
 181. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A) (2012).  
 182. Id. 
 183. Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1089. 
 184. See id. (noting that litigants may have trouble filing claims in a proper 
court due to the “complexity of the Federal court system and of special 
jurisdictional provisions,” particularly with regard to the Court of Federal 
Claims which may have jurisdiction over some claims but not others (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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logical. The court has noted that it was unreasonable to allow a 
district court to transfer an action “containing a single claim over 
which it lacked jurisdiction” under § 1631, but not permit the 
court to transfer the same claim if the litigant appended an 
additional claim to the action over which the court did have 
jurisdiction.185 Thus, the Federal Circuit has allowed less than a 
full action to be transferred under § 1631.186 Such a transfer may 
raise other issues of jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims,187 
but the Federal Circuit has found that it is both proper and 
logical under the language of the statute. 
The other circuits, while relying upon § 1631 in different 
capacities, have not weighed in on the circuit split so definitively. 
The Ninth Circuit, while not directly addressing the issue, has 
accepted that a portion of a case may be transferred.188 
                                                                                                     
 185. Id. 
 186. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal 
Circuit’s allowance of partial transfers under § 1631). 
 187. See 28 U.S.C. § 1500 (2012) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims 
“shall not have jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff or 
his assignee has pending in any other court any suit or process against the 
United States”). A lack of jurisdiction under § 1500 may arise if only some of the 
claims in an action are transferred to the Court of Federal Claims under § 1631 
and the transferred claim and the retained claim “‘arise from the same operative 
facts [and] . . . seek the same relief.’” United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 
F.3d 1084, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United 
States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also d’Abrera v. United States, 
78 Fed. Cl. 51, 57 (Fed. Cl. 2007) (“Section 1500 is not implicated . . . : (1) when 
all of the claims in an action are transferred to the Court of Federal Claims . . . 
and (2) when claims based on differing operative facts or seeking differing 
remedies are filed in district court and a transfer is made to this court . . . .” 
(citing Cnty. of Cook, 170 F.3d at 1091 n.8)). 
 188. See Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Under the 
circumstances presented, transfer of the portion of the habeas petition raising 
nationality allegations to this Court is appropriate.”). Magistrate Judge Hollows 
of the Eastern District of California has also allowed severance and transfer 
under § 1631 of four related claims, adopting reasoning similar to that of the 
Third and Tenth Circuits. See Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 
2446098, at *5–7 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2012) (recommending severance of claims 
against a single defendant and transfer to Minnesota); Johnson v. Mitchell, No. 
CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643, at *8–9 (E.D. Cal. May 10, 2012) 
(recommending severance of claims against a single defendant and transfer to 
Colorado); Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1594203, at *4–7 
(E.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (recommending severance of claims against a single 
defendant and transfer to Vermont); Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 
2012 WL 691765, at *15–17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012) (recommending severance 
of claims against a single defendant and transfer to Colorado). 
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Alternatively, the First Circuit has not excluded the possibility 
that § 1631 may allow transfer of less than an entire action, but it 
has declined to interpret the provision.189 The Fourth Circuit has 
not weighed in on the circuit split.190 
B. Division Regarding Interpretation of the Term “Action” 
The key distinction between the divided circuits noted above 
is the interpretation of the term “action” as it is used in § 1631. 
The D.C. Circuit has found that the term should be strictly 
interpreted and that “action” means something akin to the case 
as it was originally filed or a case as it would appear when ready 
to proceed to summary judgment or trial.191 A transferred action 
will usually include all viable claims and any “tag along” claims 
that were dismissed but might be subject to review when a final 
order is entered.192 Additionally, while the D.C. Circuit is not 
entirely clear on its understanding of the term “action,” it is 
helpful to see how the court has interpreted the term in other 
contexts. For example, the D.C. Circuit has also strictly 
interpreted the term “civil action” in § 717 of the Equal 
                                                                                                     
 189. See Cimon v. Gaffney, 401 F.3d 1, 7 n.20 (1st Cir. 2005) (refusing to 
affirm or review defendant’s argument that § 1631 “directs a court to transfer an 
‘action’ over which it lacks jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim” 
(quoting Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986))). 
 190. See Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-50, 2011 WL 3820711, at *10 (E.D. 
Va. Aug. 26, 2011) (noting that “[a]lthough the Fourth Circuit has not addressed 
the application of § 46110 with respect to transfer under § 1631, other federal 
circuits have concluded . . . that § 1631 permits the severance and transfer of 
less than an entire action” (internal references omitted)). 
 191. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks 
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill's claims . . . .”); supra notes 
156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s view of the circuit 
split). 
 192. See Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“‘The review 
of any order of the district court in a transferred cause, made before transfer, is 
within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals of the circuit to which the cause 
has been transferred.’” (quoting Magnetic Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 
178 F.2d 866, 870 (2d Cir. 1950))); Murthy v. Vilsac, 609 F.3d 460, 463–64 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (noting an exception to the Hill rule when the court of appeals of the 
circuit to which the cause has been transferred is unable to hear an appeal of 
the dismissed claim). 
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Employment Opportunity Act193 and has found that Congress 
could have used a different term if it meant something other than 
“civil action.”194 
Alternatively, the Tenth Circuit and the Third Circuit have 
looked to previous transfers under § 1404 to support their 
allowance of partial transfers.195 Relying on a decision that dealt 
with transfer under § 1404, the Tenth Circuit has found that 
transfer was appropriate if severance under Rule 21 was 
completed or the district court intended to sever the offending 
claims from the action.196 For transfer effectuated under § 1404, 
the Tenth Circuit has found that an “action” may change 
depending upon the dismissal or severance of certain parts.197 
The original action is maintained even if certain claims are 
severed and transferred elsewhere.198 The Third Circuit has 
found that transfer under § 1404 is similar to transfer under 
§ 1631 and “where a case could have been brought against some 
defendants in the transferee district, the claims against those 
defendants may be severed and transferred while the claims 
against the remaining defendants, for whom transfer would not 
be proper, are retained.”199 
The Federal Circuit has examined the language and 
congressional intent of § 1631 and has determined that it “allows 
                                                                                                     
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2012) (prohibiting discriminatory practices in 
employment by the federal government). 
 194. See Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 120 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1975) 
(noting that the term “civil action” is the “same term which characterizes 
unrestricted suits” and Congress could easily have used a different term “had a 
different type of proceedings been intended”). 
 195. See supra notes 162–75 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth 
and Third Circuits’ views). 
 196. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding 
transfer of less than a full action because the district court severed the claims 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21 (internal citations omitted)). 
 197. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 
1519–20 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the form of an “action” may change 
over time (internal citations omitted)). 
 198. See id. (noting that § 1404(a) “authorizes the transfer only of an entire 
action and not of individual claims,” but an action does not necessarily mean the 
action at the time it was filed (citing Wyndham Assocs. v. Bintliff, 398 F.2d 614, 
618 (2d Cir. 1968))). 
 199. D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing 
White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
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for the transfer of less than all of the claims in a civil action to 
the Court of Federal Claims.”200 The Federal Circuit has denied 
giving the term “civil action” determinative weight, instead 
looking to congressional intent and the statute’s legislative 
history to determine the true meaning of the term.201 Prior to the 
enactment of § 1631, a litigant’s only resource for preserving an 
action when unsure of jurisdiction “[was] the wasteful and costly 
one of filing in two or more courts at the same time.”202 The 
purpose of § 1631 was to “remedy the situation where a litigant 
has mistakenly filed an action in a court that lacks jurisdiction” 
and prevent the costly—and perhaps unjust—dismissal of claims. 
203 
IV. Recommendation to Resolve the Circuit Split 
As demonstrated by Johnson v. Mitchell and the cases 
discussed above, the result of the current circuit split is 
confusion, inefficiency, and inconsistent transfer use depending 
upon which transfer mechanism is relied upon.204 Partial transfer 
issues have arisen when cases are filed by pro se plaintiffs who 
lack legal sophistication205 or even experienced attorneys who are 
caught in the circuit split.206 If a court lacks jurisdiction over a 
legitimate claim, and the court dismisses it, the plaintiff may be 
                                                                                                     
 200. United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088–89 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 201. See id. at 1089 (noting that Congress’s intent is more clearly spelled out 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012)). 
 202. Id. at 1089 n.5 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 11 (1981), reprinted in 
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 21). 
 203. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 40). 
 204. See supra Part III.A–B (discussing the circuit split and interaction 
between the transfer statutes). 
 205. See Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643, at *1 
(E.D. Cal. May 10, 2012) (discussing a case filed by a pro se plaintiff who sued 
defendants across the U.S.). 
 206. See Butler, supra note 45, at 804–27 (discussing the problems and 
unexpected pitfalls that attorneys encounter in addressing venue transfer); 
Tayon, supra note 117, at 198–99 (noting that the ambiguities of venue transfer 
prior to enactment of § 1631 were akin to “jurisdictional badminton” (quoting 
Inv. Co. Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 551 F.3d 1270, 1283–
84 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Levanthal, J., concurring))).  
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forced to undergo the additional expense of refiling its claim or 
deprived of a remedy that could have been achieved in another 
venue had it been brought in time.207 A resolution is necessary to 
prevent these issues from continuing and to help maintain the 
efficiency of the judiciary. 
A. Amend Title 28 to Reflect Allowance of Partial Transfers 
The most effective way to resolve the circuit split and 
overcome the current inconsistency regarding venue transfer is to 
amend the term “civil action” in §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631 to 
include the transfer of “civil claims.” Alternatively, to prevent the 
excessive transfer of single claims or the “piecemeal” adjudication 
of related claims,208 the phrase “or any civil claim upon 
determination of severance” should be added to modify the term 
“civil action.”  
With the proposed amendment, § 1404(a) would read: “For 
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action, or civil 
claim upon determination of severance, to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought or to any district or 
division to which all parties have consented.”209 Similarly, the 
proposed amendment to § 1406 would read: 
The district court of a district in which is filed a case or 
claim laying venue in the wrong division or district shall 
dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such 
case or claim upon determination of severance to any 
district or division in which it could have been 
brought.210 
                                                                                                     
 207. See Baeta v. Sonchik, 273 F.3d 1261, 1264 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
an alien plaintiff whose habeas corpus petition was denied as late because a 
district court refused to accept the filing and the plaintiff was forced to refile in 
the appropriate court); Johnson, 2012 WL 1657643, at *9 (discussing the 
possibility that plaintiff would be required to refile his claim or lose the case due 
to the expiration of a statute of limitations if transfer was not allowed).  
 208. See Hill v. Henderson, 195 F.3d 671, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (expressing 
the D.C. Circuit’s strong stance against piecemeal adjudication). 
 209. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (proposed amendment in italics). 
 210. Id. § 1406(a) (proposed amendment in italics). 
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Due to the current circuit split discussed above, § 1631 is the 
most important statutory provision to amend. The proposed 
amendment to § 1631 would read: 
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court . . . and that court 
finds that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is 
in the interest of justice, transfer such action, claim upon 
determination of severance, or appeal to any other such court 
in which the action, claim, or appeal could have been brought 
at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action, claim, or 
appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the 
court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was 
actually filed in or noticed for the court from which it is 
transferred.211 
While the current circuit split does not include § 1404 and 
§ 1406, it would be advantageous to implement an amendment 
consistently across the three primary venue transfer statutes. A 
consistent amendment would signal to the courts that the terms 
are designed to be applied uniformly, despite the different 
circumstances of transfer. Additionally, the terms “civil action” 
and “case” as used in §§ 1404 and 1406 have already been found 
to allow severance and transfer of less than the full civil action.212 
An amendment to these two sections would simply bring the text 
of the rules in alignment with their understood meaning and 
application. Amending these sections of Title 28 to include the 
term “civil claim” or “or any civil claim upon determination of 
severance” would help to resolve the circuit split and provide 
clarity and instruction in a complicated area of the law. 
B. Amendment Comports with Congressional Intent and the 
Historical Development of Venue Transfer Mechanisms 
The amendment proposed above, or a similar one, should be 
adopted because such a change aligns with the purpose and 
intent underlying the creation of the various venue transfer 
mechanisms. The various venue transfer statutes were created 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id. § 1631 (proposed amendment in italics). 
 212. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing partial 
transfers effectuated under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text 
(discussing partial transfers effectuated under § 1406). 
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primarily to serve the interests of justice213 and to assist in the 
“expeditious and orderly adjudication of cases and controversies 
on their merits.”214 First, the forum non conveniens doctrine had 
harsh consequences, and Congress sought to remedy those effects 
by providing a means to transfer cases between forums in the 
federal system.215 Statutory venue provisions were adopted to 
prevent the cost, delay, and injustice that accompanied a forum 
non conveniens dismissal and to allow more cases to be decided 
on their merits rather than suffering from a convenience or 
procedural dismissal.216 Section 1406 in particular was designed 
to “avoid . . . the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs 
from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an 
erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact 
of the kind upon which venue provisions would turn.”217  
Second, Congress has repeatedly taken initiative to resolve 
federal procedure conflicts and to promote clear and just venue 
rules. Sections 1404 and 1406 were adopted as a response to the 
problems presented by the forum non conveniens doctrine.218 
Similarly, § 1631 was created as a remedy for cases subject to 
dismissal and refiling because a court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.219 Section 1631 became necessary after the Goldlawr, 
Inc. v. Heiman220 decision highlighted a court’s inability to use 
the statutory venue transfer mechanisms when it lacked subject 
                                                                                                     
 213. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of 
justice and the “interests of justice” in the venue transfer process). 
 214. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962). 
 215. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose 
and intent for adoption of § 1404). 
 216. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text (discussing the 
legislative purpose for enacting § 1404); supra notes 94–96 and accompanying 
text (discussing the legislative intent for enacting § 1406). 
 217. Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 466. 
 218. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text (discussing some of the 
problems with the forum non conveniens doctrine); supra notes 54–56 and 
accompanying text (discussing how adoption of § 1404 corrected some of the 
problems of the forum non conveniens doctrine); supra notes 94–96 and 
accompanying text (discussing how adoption of § 1406 corrected some of the 
problems with the forum non conveniens doctrine). 
 219. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining that § 1631 was 
adopted to cure transfer problems when a district court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 220. 369 U.S. 463 (1962). 
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matter jurisdiction.221 Congress rose to the occasion and § 1631 
was “broadly drafted to allow transfer between any two federal 
courts”222 when “there is a want of jurisdiction” in the original 
forum.223 Additionally, § 1407 is an example of Congress 
responding to the growing needs of complex multidistrict 
litigation.224 The rapid increase in large tort, antitrust, and 
patent cases in the 1950s and 1960s prompted Congress to adopt 
§ 1407 to “provide judicial machinery to transfer, for coordinated 
or consolidated pretrial proceedings, civil actions, having one or 
more common questions of fact, pending in different judicial 
districts.”225 
The current circuit split has created a situation very similar 
to the one in existence when §§ 1404 and 1406 were adopted, 
particularly for the D.C. Circuit. There currently is not a clear 
and consistent way to transfer a claim from one jurisdiction to 
another when a court lacks jurisdiction over one or more claims 
within an action.226 Thus, the ability to sever and transfer a claim 
for a want of jurisdiction depends upon where the plaintiff 
decides to file her action.227 If the plaintiff files within the D.C. 
Circuit and the court lacks jurisdiction over a claim, the court 
must dismiss the claim (with or without prejudice) and the 
plaintiff may suffer harsh consequences similar to those 
experienced under the forum non conveniens doctrine.228 It is 
                                                                                                     
 221. See id. at 466 (noting that § 1406 was broad enough to “authorize the 
transfer of cases . . . whether the court in which it was filed had personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants or not,” but failing to extend its reasoning to 
cases when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction); 14D WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 66, § 3827 (noting that a court was not permitted to transfer an 
action under §§ 1404 or 1406 unless it had subject matter jurisdiction). 
 222. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 30 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 40. 
 223. 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2012). 
 224. See supra notes 125–29 and accompanying text (discussing the 
historical development of § 1407). 
 225. H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at *1 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1898, 1898. 
 226. See supra notes 79–82 (discussing partial transfer under § 1404); supra 
notes 103–06 (discussing partial transfer under § 1406); supra Part III.A 
(discussing the circuit split regarding partial transfers under § 1631). 
 227. See supra Part III.A (describing the availability of partial transfers 
under § 1631 and noting that partial transfer is available in some circuits but 
not others). 
 228. See supra note 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing how the forum 
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precisely this kind of scenario where Congress has intervened in 
the past and provided guidance for the proper means of 
transfer.229 
Third, the proposed amendment reflects the flexibility and 
“balancing-of-interests”230 concerns inherent to the development 
of venue transfer mechanisms and severance. Currently, due to 
the language of §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631 and the rigidity of their 
interpretation, a district court is denied the flexibility to resolve a 
lack of jurisdiction in a way that promotes justice for all 
parties.231 In contrast, the forum non conveniens doctrine is a 
flexible doctrine that developed in equity to promote fairness and 
convenience.232 The doctrine decried rigid rules that limited 
judicial discretion, even while recognizing that a plaintiff’s choice 
of forum should be respected in a number of cases.233 Under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, “each case turns on its facts.”234 
Additionally, the forum non conveniens doctrine anticipates the 
availability of differing treatment for multiple claims within an 
action.235 “Depending upon the facts of the particular case, a 
district court may dismiss part of a lawsuit while deciding the 
merits of other issues.”236  
                                                                                                     
non conveniens doctrine works); supra note 207 and accompanying text (listing 
examples of problems associated with dismissing a claim for refiling). 
 229. See supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s 
previous activity to remedy confusion and conflict in venue transfer rules). 
 230. Atl. Marine Constr. Co v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 580 (2013) 
(citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). 
 231. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text (discussing the current 
lack of flexibility in transfers effectuated under § 1631). 
 232. See supra notes 39–44 (discussing the role of flexibility and balancing 
in the forum non conveniens doctrine). 
 233. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (describing the historical 
concerns of balancing a plaintiff’s interest in choosing a forum with the 
defendant’s convenience and ability to present its case). 
 234. Piper Aircraft Co v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249 (1981) (quoting Williams 
v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 557 (1946)). 
 235. See supra notes 58–62 (discussing the possibility of dismissing part of 
an action while deciding the merits of the other claims under the forum non 
conveniens doctrine). 
 236. Scottish Air Int’l, Inc. v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 
1234 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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Flexibility has also been supported through the use and 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.237 Severance 
of a claim is preferred to dismissal of a claim238 and severance has 
been employed in a number of different scenarios to allow a claim 
to proceed on its merits.239 Rule 21 and other joinder rules 
“evidence the general purpose of the new Rules to eliminate the 
old restrictive and inflexible rules of joinder designed when 
formalism was the vogue”240 and to allow a claim to proceed to 
adjudication on its merits.241 
Finally, the proposed amendment will clarify and affect 
venue transfer rules to reflect the majority of venue transfer 
practices. A number of courts have already allowed individual 
claims to be severed under Rule 21 and transferred to a proper or 
more convenient venue under §§ 1404 and 1406.242 With regards 
to § 1631, the Tenth, Third, and Federal Circuits have also 
allowed claims to be severed and transferred to a forum with 
jurisdiction.243 In addition to codifying the availability and 
mechanism for partial transfer, the proposed amendment would 
unify the practice of seeking transfer when a court lacks venue or 
jurisdiction over less than the full action.244 A single, unified 
means of addressing venue transfer assists litigants because it 
helps them know the law prior to filing and helps both litigants to 
correct mistakes without suffering the harsh consequences of 
dismissal. 
                                                                                                     
 237. FED. R. CIV. P. 21. 
 238. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that Rule 21 is a 
preferred remedy). 
 239. See supra notes 143–52 and accompanying text (discussing the variety 
of reasons why courts have severed claims and parties under Rule 21). 
 240. Soc’y of European State Authors & Composers v. WCAU Broad. Co., 1 
F.R.D. 264, 266 (E.D. Pa. 1940). 
 241. See 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1681 (explaining the history and 
purpose of Rule 21). 
 242. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the 
availability of partial transfer under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and 
accompanying text (discussing the availability of partial transfer under § 1406). 
 243. See supra notes 162–87 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth, 
Third, and Federal Circuits’ reasoning for allowing partial transfers under 
§ 1631). 
 244. See supra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to add identical 
clarifying language to §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631). 
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C. Current Transfer Mechanisms Cannot Solve the Problem 
The proposed amendment is necessary because existing 
common law and statutory transfer mechanisms are unable to 
resolve the circuit split. The current split is the result of 
disagreement in statutory interpretation, and a statutory change 
is a clear and preferable way to resolve the conflict. 
The forum non conveniens doctrine would not satisfy the 
circuit split because it has largely been preempted by the creation 
of §§ 1404, 1406, and 1631 and is now only applied when a case 
cannot be transferred to a more appropriate federal court.245 The 
doctrine, however, may be an advantageous tool when a court is 
presented with an action that includes both a claim better suited 
to a foreign jurisdiction and a claim proper for the district court 
to decide.246 The ability to dismiss part of an action under the 
forum non conveniens doctrine while retaining the rest of the 
claims is possible in these rare circumstances.247 The forum non 
conveniens doctrine may assist the courts in determining what to 
do when presented with an action where they lack jurisdiction 
over some claims and not others, but it is only applicable to a 
small segment of the disagreement noted above. 
It may also be possible to rely on other federal statutory 
provisions to resolve the circuit split. Reliance on §§ 1404 and 
1406 to remedy the circuit split, however, is inadvisable because 
both statutes were enacted to remedy problems with venue, not 
jurisdiction and certainly not a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.248 First, § 1404 was designed to transfer a case from 
one proper venue to another, albeit more convenient, proper 
                                                                                                     
 245. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1981) (noting that 
§ 1404(a) was enacted to permit a change of venue between federal courts and 
was intended to be a revision of the doctrine and not simply a “codification of the 
common law”); supra notes 52–57 (discussing the current use of the forum non 
conveniens doctrine). 
 246. See Scottish Air Int’l v. British Caledonian Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 
1234–35 (2d Cir. 1995) (dismissing part of an action on forum non conveniens 
grounds and retaining a claim because it “could only be decided in the Southern 
District of New York”). 
 247. See supra notes 58–62 (discussing the availability of partial transfers 
under the forum non conveniens doctrine). 
 248. See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the application of §§ 1404 and 
1406). 
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venue.249 While consideration of personal jurisdiction is inherent 
to the decision to transfer a case under § 1404,250 it is a secondary 
inquiry and not the purpose of the statute.251 There may be 
instances where venue is proper, but jurisdiction is lacking.252 
Any attempt to use § 1404 to correct a lack of jurisdiction distorts 
the statute because it ignores the essential purpose of the statute: 
to provide courts with a means by which they may transfer a case 
from one proper venue to another for the sake of convenience of 
the defendant.253  
Additionally, misuse of a § 1404 transfer may result in 
misapplication of choice-of-law rules. Transfer under § 1404 
requires application of the original court’s choice-of-law rules, 
while transfer under § 1631 requires application of the transferee 
court’s choice-of-law rules.254 An improper transfer standard may 
result in the application of the wrong substantive law and may 
lead to an inaccurate or unjust holding.255  
Likewise, transfer under § 1406 to correct subject matter 
jurisdiction distorts the purpose of the statute.256 Section 1406 
has been found to encompass transfers effectuated for lack of 
venue and lack of personal jurisdiction.257 This section, however, 
                                                                                                     
 249. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose 
of §§ 1404 and 1406 and how the two statutes differ). 
 250. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2012) (noting that residency of a corporation 
for purposes of determining a proper venue is dependent upon whether that 
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in a given judicial district). 
 251. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose 
of §§ 1404 and 1406 and how the two statutes differ).  
 252. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (noting that a civil action may be brought in a 
judicial district where all defendants reside, where a substantial part of the 
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or where any defendant is 
subject to personal jurisdiction if the other two provisions do not apply). 
 253. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing the key 
differences between §§ 1404 and 1406). 
 254. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-of-
law rules that apply to transfer under § 1404); supra notes 121–23 and 
accompanying text (discussing the choice-of-law rules apply to transfer under 
§ 1406). 
 255. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text (discussing the 
importance of applying the correct choice-of-law rules in venue transfer to avoid 
forum shopping). 
 256. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose 
of §§ 1404 and 1406 and how the two statutes differ). 
 257. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the Goldlawr 
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is not an option for transfer in all circumstances where a court 
lacks personal jurisdiction or where a court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction.258 Thus, while use of § 1406 may assist the courts in 
transferring cases that lack venue and personal jurisdiction, it is 
only applicable to a part of the disagreement noted above. Section 
1406 might provide a better remedy to the circuit split than 
§ 1404 because the accompanying choice-of-law rules protect 
against forum shopping259 and mirror those that accompany 
transfers effectuated under §1631.260 While closer to the mark, 
§ 1406 still does not address the entire disagreement noted above. 
Finally, while partial venue transfers after severance are 
possible under §§ 1404 and 1406, and under § 1631 in some 
circuits, they are not common.261 The availability of claim 
severance and transfer of that claim to an appropriate venue is 
largely a creation of modern statutory interpretation and common 
law.262 These options for venue transfer are not reliable and their 
inconsistent use creates confusion and may provide opportunities 
for abuse.263 Congressional action appears to be the most helpful 
means of resolving the circuit split. The current situation is 
similar to instances where Congress has acted in the past,264 and 
                                                                                                     
decision which expanded the concept of “improper venue” to cases where venue 
and personal jurisdiction were lacking). 
 258. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text (explaining that, prior 
to the adoption of § 1631, courts were unable to transfer cases when they lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the action). 
 259. See supra notes 100–02 and accompanying text (explaining the choice-
of-law rules that accompany transfers effectuated under § 1406). 
 260. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (discussing the choice-
of-law rules that apply when transfer is completed under § 1631). 
 261. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (exploring the 
availability of partial transfers under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and 
accompanying text (discussing the availability of partial transfers under 
§ 1406); supra Part III.A (explaining the availability of partial transfers under 
§ 1631 and the current circuit split). 
 262. See supra notes 79–82 and accompanying text (discussing the 
availability of partial transfers under § 1404); supra notes 103–06 and 
accompanying text (discussing the availability of partial transfers under 
§ 1406); supra Part III.A (discussing the availability of partial transfers under 
§ 1631 and the current circuit split). 
 263. See Butler, supra note 45, at 804–27 (discussing the problems and 
unexpected pitfalls that attorneys encounter in addressing inconsistent venue 
transfer rules). 
 264. See supra notes 218–29 and accompanying text (discussing instances 
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Congressional action would be particularly helpful because the 
circuit split is primarily due to differing interpretations of 
Congress’s use of the term “civil action.”265  
V. Conclusion 
The problem noted by the court in Johnson v. Mitchell266 does 
not show signs of being resolved quickly. The D.C. Circuit has 
determined that a court may not transfer less than an entire 
legal action,267 but the Tenth Circuit,268 Third Circuit,269 and the 
Federal Circuit270 have found that a district court may transfer 
less than an entire legal action when the court lacks jurisdiction 
over certain claims and the associated defendants.271 As discussed 
above, the inconsistency and current lack of clarity regarding 
venue rules can cause a number of problems, the least of which 
are increased costs, delays, and dismissal of a meritorious claim 
without the ability to refile in another forum.  
The best means of resolving the circuit split is to amend Title 
28 by changing the limited terms “civil action” and “case” in 
                                                                                                     
where Congress has acted to remedy problems with venue transfers). 
 265. See supra Part III.B (discussing disagreement between the circuits over 
the terms “civil action” or “case”). 
 266. Johnson v. Mitchell, No. CIV S-10-1968, 2012 WL 1657643 (E.D. Cal. 
May 10, 2012). 
 267. See Hill v. U.S. Air Force, 795 F.2d 1067, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1986) 
(“Because Section 1631 directs a court to transfer an ‘action’ over which it lacks 
jurisdiction, rather than an individual claim, we find that the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing . . . to transfer Hill's claims . . . .”); supra notes 
156–61 and accompanying text (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s views). 
 268. See FDIC. v. McGlamery, 74 F.3d 218, 222 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming a 
district court’s order that transferred some, but not all, of plaintiff’s claims 
because the court effectively severed the problematic claims under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 21 prior to transfer); supra notes 162–68 and accompanying 
text (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s views on the circuit split). 
 269. See D’Jamoos v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd, 566 F.3d 94, 110 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(permitting “transfer of all or only part of an action”); supra notes 171–75 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s view of the circuit split). 
 270. See United States v. Cnty. of Cook, Ill., 170 F.3d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (holding that “§ 1631 allows for the transfer of less than all of the claims 
in a civil action to the Court of Federal Claims”); supra notes 176–87 and 
accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuit’s rationale for allowing 
severance and transfer of a partial action). 
 271. See supra Part III.A (discussing the circuit split in detail). 
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§§ 1631, 1404, and 1406 to include transfer of “claims.” This 
amendment would create consistency by allowing all district 
courts to transfer claims that are filed in an inconvenient or 
flawed forum. Such a change would serve the interests of justice, 
and it aligns with the purpose and intent of the existing venue 
transfer mechanisms. Additionally, an amendment is necessary 
because the existing common law and statutory transfer 
mechanisms cannot resolve the circuit split. While venue transfer 
rules have proven to be flexible and responsive to a variety of 
societal changes, the current split is a result of differing 
interpretations of statutory venue rules. A statutory change to 
clarify the scope and mechanism for venue transfer is the best 
means to resolve a difference of statutory interpretation. The 
historical values of fairness, justice, and flexibility noted above 
are best served by amending the current transfer statutes to 
reflect permissive transfer of claims within an action and 
detailing a clear process for severance and transfer. 
